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NOTES AND COMMENTS
8

regulate this fashion, but it appears that wearing a topless gown or
bathing suit (in absence of some other legislation) will not be a criminal
act.
Leigh H. Taylor
OPEN ACCOUNT: TITLE 12 SECTION

936 OKLAHOMA

STATUTES TITLED "ATTORNEY FEES TA.XED AS COSTS IN
ACTIONS TO RECOVER OPEN ACCOUNTS"

Title 12 Section 936 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides as follows:
"In any civil action to recover on an open account the prevailing party
shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court to be
taxed and collected as costs."
This statute presents two problems; the first being a determination
of what is an open account, which will be dealt with in this note, and
the second being what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee under this
statute. The problem of reasonable attorney fees is dealt with, in part
in the various Bar Association's minimum fee schedules.
The rule for statutory construction in Oklahoma is; "Words used in
any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a
contrary intention plainly appears....
"Account" (as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code) "means a
right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which
is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper."2 The Legislature has
not given us a definitive statement on the meaning of the word "open,"
as used in this statute, therefore the Court must define the phrase "open
account."
The problem is that this is an old phrase used in a new statute, and
a statute that necessarily requires a precise definition of the phrase.

Prior to enactment of statutes such as this it made little difference whether
the action brought was one on an implied contract, an account stated, a
book account, or an open account. This is reflected in the statement of
the California Court in Fresno Credit Bureau v. Batteate,s where the
Court, using the phrases "open account," "open book account," and "book
account" interchangeably, said;
The evidence was sufficient to support a judgment upon the
8
* S.H.A. Ch. 38 § 11-9.a.3 (ILL. REV. STAT. 1961) provides punishment
for "a lewd exposure of the body done with intent to arouse or to satisfy the
sexual desire of the person." The Committee Comment states

". .

. that the exposure

necessary is an exposure of the 'body' and not of a particular part. This does not
imply an intent to regulate swim fashions.... However, certain exposures of the
body could occur which would justly deserve attention as shocking and disgusting
public affronts." This statute while it seems to exclude topless bathing suits, might
be broad enough to include topless gowns although it seems ridiculous to regulate
one and not the other.
125 OKLA. STAT. § 1.
2 UNIFORM CoMMRCIAL CODE § 9-106.

3 102 Cal.App.2d 545, 227 P.2d 851 (1951).
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cause of action based on an open book account or upon an implied
contract and, as was said in Hansen v. Burford, 212 Cal. 100, 107,
297 P. 908, 911; 'The distinction, as a matter of pleading, between
a book account and an ordinary contract debt not founded on a
writing, in only important when, as in Wright v. Loaiza, 177 Cal.
605, 171 P. 311, the statute of limitations is involved and where the
question arises whether suit may be commenced within four years,
or must be begun within two years after the cause of action has
accrued. In the present case, all the transactions were had within
two years before the complaint was filed. In these circumstances the
distinction between pleading a book account and pleading an
4
indebtedness generally seems to us inconsequential."
(emphasis added)
In the case of Drakos v. Edwards,' an action for money due on
open account, professional services had been rendered to Drakos, intermittently over a period of about four and one-half years. Charges were
made for the services rendered and Drakos was given credits for payments
made to Dr. Edwards. The court in this case does not enter into a
discussion of whether or not this would constitute an "open account"
under the statute, but in sustaining the trial courts allowance of an
attorney's fee for the trial of the case, and granting an additional
attorneys fee for the appeal of the suit, necessarily did decide that this
factual situation constitutes an "open account."
In Globe & Republic Ins. Co. v. Independent Trucking Co.' the
only other case construing this statute, the court held that the claim
sued upon did not constitute an "open account." In this case Independent
was in the business of hauling oil field equipment. Globe furnished an
insurance policy to Independent covering loss or damage of such equipment while in the hands of Independent. Independent was engaged to
haul certain equipment and it was damaged while in its custody. The
owner sued Independent and Globe defended the suit. The judgment
was against Independent and Globe refused to pay this judgment on the
grounds that the damage was not covered by its insurance policy.
Independent paid the judgment and then brought this action to recover
the amount paid plus a reasonable attorney's fee. The trial court found
for Independent and allowed an attorney's fee of $450.00.
On appeal in support of the court's allowance of the attorney fee,
Independent contended its action was one founded on an open account
within the meaning of the phrase as used in the statute. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Davison, held that the statute
was not applicable in that Independent's action was based upon a written
contract. The court quoted the following statement from Connor Livestock Co. v.Fisher,
Generally speaking, an open account is one where there are running
on concurrent dealings between the parties, which are kept unclosed
with the expectation of further transactions ...An express contract
4227 P.2d at 852.

s385 P.2d 459 (Okla. 1963).
6387 P.2d 644 (Okla. 1963).
732 Ariz. 80, 255 P. 996 (1927).
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which defines the duties and liabilities of the parties, whether it be
oral or written is not as a rule an open account.8
The Drakos case can be taken as representing a fact situation which
would always constitute an "open account," while the Globe case is an
example of a fact situation which does not constitute an "open account."
The latter provides a hint or guideline to follow in determining what
future factual situations the court will hold to be "open accounts," in
the gray area which lies between these two decisions.
One of the major problems that lies in this gray area is the determination of what type of contract will be embraced in a restricted
definition of "open account." The court, in the Globe case, speaking in
generalities, said; "An express contract which defines the duties and
liabilities of the parties, whether it be oral or written, is not, as a rule,
an open account."' (emphasis added) Does this mean that the signing
of a sales slip, which has terms and conditions printed thereon, for a
charge purchase at a department store would remove the running balance
of that charge account from the purview of the "open account" statute?
A strong argument could be made in support of an affirmative answer
to this question in light of the Globe decision. However it would appear
that this is the very type of account this statute was designed to cover.
These are the accounts on which numerous charge purchases are made.
and on which a running balance is kept with the expectation of further
transactions and periodic payments. It is submitted that this is the first
type of account which the layman as well as the attorney might think
of when he hears the phrase "open account."
It would appear that an account stated cannot be defined as an
"open account" because: "An account stated is an agreement, express or
implied. The amount or balance so agreed upon constitutes a new and
independent cause of action, superseding and merging the antecedent
cause of action represented by the particular constituent items . . . An
account stated is a new obligation, taking the place of the obligation
upon the prior account."'" Arguably an open account can be changed
into an account stated to effect an avoidance of the attorneys fee
allowed for a suit on an "open account." This would be beneficial to
both the debtor and the creditor. If the debtor knows that he owes the
balance claimed by his creditor he can admit that balance, thus changing
the "open account" into an account stated, and avoid the additional
expense of the attorney fee. If the debtor takes this course the creditor
will be in a much better position to reduce his claim to a final judgment,
because of the difficulties which are associated with proving the individual
items in an "open account" and the comparative ease in proving the
8
Supra note 6 at 647.
9
Ibid.
0
1 Webster Drilling Co. v. Sterling Oil of Okla., Inc. 376 P.2d 236, 238
(Okla. 1962) This case stands for the proposition that an account stated is an
agreement express or implied. For cases holding that an open account cannot be
evidenced by such an agreement see: Costello v. Bank of America Nat'l. Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 246 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1957); Globe & Republic Ins. Co. v.
Independent Trucking 387 P.2d 644 (Okla. 1963); Durkin v. Durkin 133
Cal.App.2d 283, 284 P.2d 185 (Cal. 1955); Connor Livestock Co. v. Fisher 32

Ariz. 80, 255 P. 996 (1927)
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